别着急，如果相关单位遵守国际民航组织相关规定。下个月可能就可以看见最终调查报告，就算没有最终调查报告，也应公布调查进展报告
因为根据国际民航组织ICAO规定
- 负责调查的国家必须在事故发生之日起30天内向国际民航组织提交一份初步报告。可自行决定初步报告是保密还是公开
- 负责调查的国家应尽可能在12个月以内公布最终调查报告
- 如果无法在12个月内发布最终调查报告，应在事故发生的每个周年日公布一份临时声明，详细说明调查的进展和提出的任何安全问题
可以看看德国之翼4U9525调查时间线
- 2015年3月24日空难发生
- 2015年3月24日CVR被发现
- 2015年3月25日CVR被移交给相关部门进行读取
- 2015年3月27日EASA发布了一份关于驾驶舱内授权人员的安全信息公告
- 2015年3月28日FDR被发现
- 2015年4月2日FDR被移交给相关部门进行读取
- 2015年5月6日法国民航安全调查分析局(BEA)发布初步调查报告
4U9525号班机空难初步调查报告结论：在巡航阶段，副驾驶独自一人在驾驶舱内。然后他故意修改了自动驾驶指令，控制飞机下降，直到飞机与地面相撞。
此初步调查报告内容以基本判定了事故发生的原因，前前后后也就一个多月的时间
而MU5735空难并没有公开调查报告，只是发了一个“调查初步报告的情况通报”，当然这符合国际民航组织“可自行决定初步报告是保密还是公开”的规定，不过最终调查报告可是必须得公开的哦，所以等下一个月吧
附赠国际民航组织关于事故调查部分的相关文件中的描述
Article 26 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) states that, in the event of an accident to an aircraft of a Contracting State occurring in another Contracting State, and involving either death, serious injury, or serious technical defect in the aircraft or air navigation facilities, the State in which the accident occurs will institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the accident.
Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation) to the Convention provides further international requirements for the investigation of aircraft accidents and incidents. It spells out which States may participate in an investigation, such as the States of Occurrence, Registry, Operator, Design and Manufacture. It also defines the rights and responsibilities of such States.
The State of Occurrence may delegate all or part of the investigation to another State or a regional accident and incident investigation organization, and may call on the best technical expertise available from any source to assist with the investigation. States of Registry, Operator, Design and Manufacture who participate in an investigation are entitled to appoint an accredited representative (with or without associated advisers) to take part in the investigation.
A State which has a special interest in an accident, by virtue of fatalities or serious injuries to its citizens for instance, is entitled to appoint an expert entitled to: visit the scene of the accident; have access to the relevant factual information which is approved for public release by the State conducting the investigation, and information on the progress of the investigation; receive a copy of the accident investigation Final Report. ICAO officials only participate in accident investigations upon special request from the State responsible for conducting the investigation.
How are Annex 13 accident investigations reported?
States in charge of an investigation must submit a Preliminary Report to ICAO within thirty days of the date of the accident, unless the Accident/Incident Data Report has been sent by that time. Preliminary Reports may be marked as confidential or remain public at the investigating State’s discretion.
The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall also make the Final Report publicly available as soon as possible and, if possible, within twelve months. If the report cannot be made publicly available within twelve months, the State conducting the investigation shall make an interim statement publicly available on each anniversary of the occurrence – detailing the progress of the investigation and any safety issues raised. For accidents or incidents involving an aircraft of a maximum mass over 5 700 kg, States in charge of an Annex 13 investigation must make the Final Report available to ICAO.
附赠德国之翼4U952空难初步调查报告“INITIAL FINDINGS”和“THE ONGOING SAFETY INVESTIGATION”部分
2. INITIAL FINDINGS
On the basis of the initial facts gathered during the investigation, the following findings have been made:
The aeroplane had a valid Certificate of Airworthiness.
- The aeroplane’s maintenance documentation did not mention any system failures that were incompatible with the flight as planned.
- The flight crew possessed the licences and ratings required to perform the flight.
- The co-pilot obtained his class 1 medical certificate without restrictions in April 2008, valid for one year.
- An episode of depression and the taking of medication to treat it delayed the renewal of the copilot’s class 1 medical certificate between April and July 2009.
- From July 2009, the co-pilot’s medical certificate was endorsed with the note ‘‘Note the special conditions/restrictions of the waiver FRA 091/09 -REV-’’. His pilot’s licence had been endorsed with the note ‘‘***SIC**incl. PPL***’’.
- The Captain’s and co-pilot’s training files show that their professional level was above standard.
- The aeroplane took off from Barcelona bound for Düsseldorf on 24 March 2015 at 9 h 00, with flight number 4U9525, and callsign GWI18G.
- The autopilot and autothrust were engaged during the climb.
- The Captain left the cockpit at the beginning of the cruise at FL380.
- The selected altitude changed from 38,000 ft to 100 ft while the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit. The aeroplane then started a continuous and controlled descent on autopilot.
- Several altitude selections towards 100 ft were recorded during descent on the flight that preceded the accident flight, while the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit.
- During the descent of the accident flight, the Marseille control centre called the flight crew on eleven occasions on three different frequencies, without any answer being transmitted.
- The French military defence system tried to contact flight GWI18G on three occasions during the descent, without any answer.
- The buzzer to request access to the cockpit sounded once during the descent, 4 min 7 s after the Captain had left.
- The interphone sounded in the cockpit, 4 min 40 s after the Captain had lef.
- Three other calls on the interphone sounded in the cockpit.
- None of the calls using the interphone elicited any answer.
- An input on the right sidestick was recorded for about 30 seconds on the FDR 1 min 33 s before the impact, not enough to disengage the autopilot.
- The autopilot and autothrust remained engaged until the end of the CVR and the FDR recordings.
- The sound of breathing was recorded on the CVR until a few seconds before the end of the flight.
- Before the collision with the terrain, warnings from the GPWS, Master Caution and Master Warning sounded.
- The aeroplane collided with the terrain at 9 h 41 min 06.
3. THE ONGOING SAFETY INVESTIGATION
The initial information from the investigation shows that, during the cruise phase, the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit. He then intentionally modified the autopilot instructions to order the aeroplane to descend until it collided with the terrain. He did not open the cockpit door during the descent, despite requests for access made via the keypad, the cabin interphone and knocks on the door.
The Safety Investigation is ongoing, based in particular on a detailed analysis of information on the flight crew, as well as on information from the flight recorders and radio communications.
The investigation will also study the systemic failings that may have led to this accident or to similar events, with two main investigative orientations:
Medical aspects: the investigation will seek to understand the current balance between medical confidentiality and flight safety. It will specifically aim to explain how and why pilots can be in a cockpit with the intention of causing the loss of the aircraft and its occupants, despite the existence of:
- regulations setting mandatory medical criteria for flight crews, especially in the areas of psychiatry, psychology and behavioural problems;
- recruitment policies, as well as the initial and recurrent training processes within airlines.
Cockpit security: the investigation will seek to understand the compromises that were made between the requirements of security, specifically those that followed the attacks on 11 September 2001, and the requirements of flight safety. In this context, the investigation will include a focus on cockpit door locking systems and cockpit access and exit procedures.